Fig. 1 ARL cyber research was informed by real-world environment
An important feature of ARL's business model is the great degree of collaboration with the academic community. One example is the Cyber Collaborative Research Alliance (CRA) (McDaniel and Swami 2016) that brings together, in closely integrated collaborative projects, ARL scientists with academic researchers from dozens of U.S. universities. Cyber CRA aims to develop the fundamental science of cyber detection, risk, agility, as well as the overarching challenge of human factors in cyber security. Similarly, the Network Science Collaborative Technology Alliance (see http://www.ns-cta.org/) integrates ARL and academic research efforts towards a broad understanding of how multi-genre networks of humans and information and communications devices influence each other and undergo complex dynamic transformations.
ARL collaborations are not limited to U.S. universities. ARL is also actively engaged with international partners. ARL's Open Campus business model (http://www.arl.army.mil/www/default.cfm?page=2357) helps such wide-ranged collaborations by providing facilities and organizational support for enabling scientists and engineers from the U.S. and abroad to come to ARL for a period of time to work in partnership with ARL scientists.
Complementing its close ties with academic scientists, ARL research is also intertwined with practical, day-to-day operational responsibilities. Scientists are in direct communications with cyber analysts from the ARL Cybersecurity Service Provider (CSSP), a Tier II organization that defends networks of hundreds of customers belonging to all U.S. Military services, other government organizations, and even industrial entities (e.g., Oniha et al 2016) . ARL has a strong reputation in the area of threat analysis and forensics. The laboratory's experts in these fields are in high demand as they support cyber-related investigations conducted by law enforcement and counter-intelligence bodies. Vulnerability and survivability assessments of systems and networks that are either already deployed or are still in acquisition process, are another major area of ARL practical, hands-on contributions to Army cybersecurity . ARL's highly experienced teams of experts perform Cooperative Vulnerability and Penetration Assessments (blue team assessments) as well as Adversarial Assessments (red team assessments). Practical operational insights and needs obtained in operational activities are provided to scientists. They, in turn, utilize observations and data to develop new theories and models, and eventually to develop tools that transition into operational use.
Although participants of a broad cyber research community, ARL cyber scientists are largely driven by challenges unique to the ground operations of the Army. A key example is the exceptionally large attack surface of Army networks: the Army operates in environments within close proximity to allied and civilian assets and adversaries, comprising a complex cyber ecosystem. Forward-deployed network assets are vulnerable to cyber entry or physical capture and subversion of information and devices. Another distinct feature of Army cyber environments is the relatively disadvantaged assets, as the Soldiers' computing and communication devices are energy and weight constrained, with limited bandwidth and computational capacity. Large number of nodes and fast changes of Army cyber environments are also quite distinct. Soldiers operate in a mobile environment, in complex terrain, with rapidly changing connectivity. Lastly, these networks are often interspersed with civilian, allied, and adversarial networks.
These challenges inform and focus of ARL's research areas. One key area of research is the understanding the cyber threat. The topics in this area range from inferring influences and relations within a command and control organization from its encrypted communications, to novel uses of stylometry for identifying authors or origins of malware (Caliskan-Islam and Harang 2015) , to tools and techniques for forensic analysis, and even to the study of cultural factors and personality that influence patterns of behaviors of cyber actors (Cho et al 2016) .
Understanding the threats contributes to the characterization of risk experienced by a system or network. ARL's research in risk characterization includes such topics as statistical analysis of factors affecting the anticipated frequency of successful cyber attacks (Gil et al 2014) , and theoretical approaches to network risk computation (Cam 2015) . It also includes applied efforts to develop better procedures for risk inspection programs; tools for continuous monitoring of risk, cyber situational awareness , and decision support systems for cyber risk assessments.
Knowing the risks helps focus the detection efforts (Kott and Arnold 2013) . The comprehensive portfolio of ARL's research in detection of hostile cyber activities is based on close integration with practical network defense operations. It provides data and insights, and leads to the study of topics like the impact of packet loss in realistic cyber sensors on effectiveness of intrusion detection (Smith et al 2016) . Other topics include special challenges of detection in cyber physical systems (Colbert 2016, Colbert and ; use of machine learning for detection methods suitable for mobile, resource-constrained devices , Harang 2016 ; cognitive models of human analyst's process of detection ; and synergistic approaches to human-machine intrusion detection (Ben-Asher and Yu 2016).
Ultimately, whether detected or not, the hostile cyber activities must be defeated. ARL explores approaches such as active cyber defense (Marvel et al 2014) , post-intrusion triage for optimized recovery (Mell and Harang 2014) , and cyber maneuvers that limit lateral propagation of hostile malware (Ben-Asher et al 2016).
These research projects are supported by a network of experimental facilities and laboratories dedicated to cyber research. For example, the ARL Cybersecurity Service Provider performs double duty: it supports large-scale operational cyber defense, but also acts as a laboratory for collection of realworld data for research, and a platform for insertion and testing of novel cyber defense tools continually invented and developed by ARL scientists.
Another example of a laboratory is the virtual laboratory called CyberVAN. It is an environment for design and execution of cyber experiments using virtual machines, real Army applications, and a network simulator capable of realistic portrayal of sizeable Army units in mobile operations in complex terrain. CyberVAN is particularly well suited for experimental validation of theoretical results by academic researchers, including international collaborators.
Additionally, the Army Cyber-research and Analytics Laboratory at ARL serves as an environment that supports various industrial and federally-funded partners of ARL. Its functions range: personnel training, product integration, systems engineering, and integrated testing using real-world data. The CHIMERA laboratory specializes in the study of human factors and human-information interactions in cyber defense; it helps to explore the human dimension of cybersecurity.
All this research yields results, many of which transitioned to practice as tools and systems. For example, Interrogator is an ARL-developed suite of network monitoring, intrusion detection and intrusion analysis tools. Used at ARL, as well as at a number of other organizations, its architecture is optimized for government cyber security operations, for defense against sophisticated threats, and for rapid insertion of research tools as plug-ins. Another example, Interrogator-in-a-Box, was developed for defense of mobile tactical networks. In addition, DShell is a framework for forensic analysis, popular with users at government agencies. ARL researchers attracted multiple, valuable international collaborators -and a good number of comments on social media -when they developed an open-source version of DShell and placed it on GitHub (see GitHub.com/USArmyResearchLab). Other examples of practical tools developed at ARL include COBWebS, a simulation tool that incorporate cyber warfare elements into training exercises, and a decision support tool for cybersecurity assessments, which helps perform assessments using public knowledge sources and custom data.
Looking further out, our long-term campaign of cyber research is guided by the vision of the future Army battlefield. In the year 2040, it will be a highly converged virtual-physical space, where cyber operations will be an integral part of the fight (Kott et al 2015) . Cyber fires are the activities that will degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive and destroy not only informational, computational and communication resources of the adversary, but also the physical capabilities of its platforms, weapons, robots, munitions, and even of personnel. Cyber maneuver refer to activities that will rapidly move and transform the friendly informational-computational resources to deny the adversary an opportunity to attack, while imposing on him a new unsolvable problem (Fig. 2) . Cyber fires and maneuver will rely on effective cyber intelligence collection capabilities.
Operating on multiple time scales, often far faster than human cognitive processes, in a highly dynamic, non-contiguous battlefield, these fires and maneuvers will join the conventional, kinetic fires and movements. Future cyber capabilities will have to support continuous (real-time, not just deliberate) planning and execution of highly agile, daring, aggressive cyber fires and maneuvers This will be performed in a way that is necessarily highly automated and reliant on machine intelligence, and yet responsive to human intent and guidance.
Fig. 2 ARL cyber research is increasingly focused on cyber fires and maneuvers in tactical environments
For these reasons, our cyber research efforts will increasingly focus on developing the models, methods, and understanding to overcome existing barriers to the realization of effective cyber fires and maneuvers in a tactical environment. The goals of this work are to pursue near-autonomous detection and identification of malicious activity directed at friendly networks; methods to rapidly respond to adversarial activities; predictive characterization of network vulnerabilities; and a robust framework to assess networks. Moreover, our research program will focus on the realization of methodologies for the reliable reconfiguration of friendly cyber assets to evade or recover from attack; covert means for collection and predictive analysis of enemy actions; and methodologies to degrade or destroy adversarial cyber assets with high certainty and predictable probabilities of success.
